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“…the proximity of the Other is not simply close to me in space, or close 
like a parent, but he approaches me essentially insofar as I feel myself—
insofar as I am—responsible for him. It is a structure that in nowise 
resembles the intentional relation which in knowledge attaches us to the 
object— no matter what object, be it a human object. Proximity does not 
revert to this intentionality; in particular it does not revert to the fact 
that the other is known to me”  
Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity 
 
“..while feigning to reproduce the ends of Narcissus’s sentences, Echo 
‘intends’—if intentionality is defined as, and I repeat, ‘a process of 
appropriate by repetition, by identification, by idealization’—to speak for 
herself and to declare her love.”  
Pleshette DeArmitt, The Right to Narcissism 
In The Right to Narcissism: A Case for Im-Possible Self-Love, Pleshette 
DeArmitt opens the space for an alternative to the origin story so popular 
with political philosophers, namely, the social contract, which assumes a 
rational and self-identical subject.  She does this obliquely by deconstructing 
narcissism as love of the self-same, or, love of what Kristeva might call “the 
clean and proper self.”  Like Echo interrupting Narcissus’s soliloquy of 
deadly self-absorbed pleasure and his solitary auto-affection upon seeing his 
own reflection, Pleshette interrupts the seeming proximity of self-same, the 
closeness of near, and the propinquity of proper by deflecting the image of 
Narcissus onto the voice of Echo, who comes into her own by repeating his 
words.  How, asks Pleshette, can Echo’s reiteration of the words of another 
be anything more than mere repetition or reduplication?1 Echoing Derrida, 
she answers that it is through a declaration of love.  Echo’s repetition of the 
words of Narcissus take on new meaning, and allow her to express herself, 
and her love, through the words of the other.  After all, words are words of 
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the other.  Language comes to us from the other.  Echo becomes a self, a 
“little narcissist,” through an address from and to the other, through the 
appropriation and ex-appropriation of the other’s words.   
Re-reading the myth of Narcissus through the subject position of 
Echo—and Rousseau, Kristeva, and Derrida on self-other relations through 
proximity, Pleshette develops what she calls an ethics of Narcissism based 
on response and responsibility that recuperates intentionality and agency 
from philosophy’s turn to the other.  Unlike Levinas, who insists that 
responsibility is nothing like intentionality, and following a certain Derrida, 
Pleshette argues for a “little narcissism” that re-establishes intentional 
agency through reiteration and repetition rather than self-authorship or 
autonomy of the will.   
Pleshette’s account of the “origin” of the self as a mirror of the other 
suggests that the “real” Narcissus in Ovid’s myth is the image in the pond or 
the mimicking voice of Echo; and that the solitary man (or boy) himself is 
the real illusion.  More to the point, her account suggests that “we” are 
caught in a hall of mirrors or an echo chamber, both mourning and 
celebrating that we are always and only chasing an illusion of self-sameness, 
an illusion of stable identity, an illusion of some unified “we.”  All self-same 
identity, whether individual, group, or state, is an illusion produced by 
repetition, specifically, it is a deception of proximity or closeness to oneself, 
one’s group, or one’s nation.  Or, in the case of philosophy, the illusion may 
be that of human beings’ special proximity to the meaning of life, or to Being 
itself.  Necessary illusion or dangerous supplement?   
It is this illusion of proximity that Derrida challenges in his famous 
engagement with Heidegger in 1968 in “The Ends of Man” when he asks 
who is the “we” of philosophy?  Who is the “man” of metaphysics?  He 
answers that, among other things, this we, this man, is self-sustained, auto-
matic, what later he might identify with Robinson Crusoe’s wheel spinning 
on its axis.  Insofar as the metaphysical subject is sustained by its own self- 
proclaimed ends, the man of philosophy is just spinning his wheels.  That is 
to say, both the man of traditional metaphysics, and Heidegger’s anti-
metaphysical Dasein, are defined in terms of a telos (what is proper to man), 
and in terms of death (the end of man).  Derrida suggests that the double 
meaning of the phrase “ends of man” comes down to “the play of a certain 
proximity, proximity to oneself,” a proximity that ultimately cannot be so 
easily assumed or secured, a nearness that is “trembling,” as he says.2 
Calling into question the erection of/as what is proper to man, yet still 
echoing Heidegger, Derrida ‘deconstructs’ the oppositions between the near 
and the far, the close and the distant, the inside and the outside, and 
ultimately, the self and the other, man and woman…Narcissus and Echo? 
What, we might ask, if the “man” of metaphysics is not a man at all?  
And to make matters worse, what if there is nothing proper to this no-man?  
K e l l y  O l i v e r  |  3 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIII, No 2 (2015)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2015.694 
What if he is really an outlawed she who owns nothing, not even her voice, 
which must be given to her by--or taken, even stolen, from--another?  What 
if the “proper” (and therefore displaced) subject of philosophy is not the 
man who dies, but the woman who mourns?  Indeed, what if she is 
constituted as a self through her mourning of the other rather than through 
her own being-unto-death.  The death of the other rips out her heart, silences 
her lips, and undoes her sovereignty, if she ever had any.  What if the 
philosophical subject is not the man in love with himself, but rather the 
woman--wood nymph, or perhaps even disembodied voice, ghost or 
revenant of one--who loved another.   
Starting Echo as a displaced origin, Pleshette transforms the 
metaphysical subject into an ethical subject anchored only by its tenuous 
relationship with another being through a call and response that depends 
upon a proximity of another sort, an embodied social proximity that 
revolves around listening, hearing, and responding to, the other.  Still 
mortal, if no longer merely human all too human, these ethical beings, 
perhaps wood nymphs in the forest, are called into their own not in relation 
to their own individual deaths, but rather in relation to the death of the 
other, that is to say, in relation to the fact that one of them will die before the 
other, and that one of them will survive to face the immeasurable loss of his 
or her beloved.   
The death of the other undoes all illusions of mastery and sovereignty, 
namely, the “I control” or “I can.”  Yet, at the same time the death of the 
other constitutes the self as one who mourns.  Quoting Derrida, “I mourn 
therefore I am.”3 As Pleshette tells us, as if speaking directly to us in our 
own time of mourning her, “We must and must not get over the other, 
making the position of the survivor truly untenable, often unbearable, 
always impossible.”4 Yet, as Pleshette also insists, this untenable position is 
the locus of the ethical subject, constituted through both love and loss.  For, 
there is no love without loss precisely because one of us dies before the 
other.  Contained within all love is loss.  And, within every self is a 
multitude of others.  
Recuperating the proximity of the self-same through the language of the 
other, Pleshette reclaims a certain intentionality—we might say, a “little” 
intentionality--that takes us beyond mere repetition or calculation, beyond 
moral law or rule following, and towards ethics, and possibly even politics.  
Implicitly taking issue with Levinas’s insistence that the proximity of the 
other shatters intentionality, Pleshette suggests an alternative, even 
forbidden, intentionality as response to and from the other that makes 
intentionality a form of ethical responsibility.  For Pleshette, Echo is “a ‘little 
narcissist’ who is responsible to the other by answering and returning his 
call.  Yet, while echoing the words of her other, Echo is resourceful enough 
to speak of and for herself, signing her own name” by declaring her love.5  
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While acknowledging the fundamental loss of self at the core of 
subjectivity, or what we might call “the improper that is proper to man,” 
Pleshette focuses on love, if always a forbidden love.  Instead of dwelling on 
Narcissus’s severe rebuff and rejection of Echo’s embrace, Pleshette 
celebrates the possibility of escaping the harsh confines of a punishing law 
to express the chance of love.  Recall Ovid’s myth wherein when Narcissus 
says “I would rather die than have you caress me,” Echo responds “Caress 
me.”  Rather than focus on Narcissus’s cruelty and ultimate death, Pleshette, 
following Derrida, rereads this story as a love story and emphasizes another 
proximity to counter the proximity of self-love that is usually the moral of 
the story.  Rather, Pleshette recounts Narcissus, lost in the woods, calling out 
“Is anyone nearby?” and Echo responding “Nearby,” and in response to the 
question “Is anybody here?” answering “Here.”    
In his last words on Echo, in an 2002 conversation with Jean-Luc Nancy, 
describing infinite responsibility, Derrida says, Echo, “in repeating the last 
words, or rather the last syllables, in order to obey and at the same time 
disobey the law, that is, in order to say something in her own name by 
playing with language, she manages to produce a totally unforeseeable 
event for Narcissus.”6 This event derails the sovereign performance of 
responsibility and opens up the possibility of ethical response rather than 
calculated reaction, which is the hallmark of responsibility, or what Derrida 
calls responsibility “to come” beyond recognition, subjectivity, will, 
autonomy, and freedom.7  This beyond could be called love. 
For, it is through love that Echo transforms her reiteration of the words 
of Narcissus from mere repetition into a response.   Pleshette says, “it is 
Echo’s love that infuses and gives new life to the words of Narcissus; it is 
her love that exceeds his call to come.”8 She prepares our ears to hear Echo’s 
reiteration as a declaration of her own love by taking us on a “journey 
through an exploration of voice as a process of iteration and ex-
appropriation, which must always take the form of, and gain its force from, 
a loving affirmation.”9  She identifies this journey with deconstruction itself.  
“Echo, an exemplary figure of a deconstruction of self and a figure of 
deconstruction itself, offers us another narrative of narcissism, which does 
not disavow mourning but instead opens itself to the experience of the other 
as other.”10  
To echo the very last line of Pleshette’s book, in her very last footnote, 
“Deconstruction as love.”11  Like Echo, deconstruction takes the words of a 
text and repeats them in order to make them say something in excess of 
what they appear to mean.  We could imagine that this is also true of a 
certain type of analytic practice whereby the by analyst returns to the 
analysand his or her own words, the ends of sentences, fragments of a story, 
in order to facilitate what Kristeva calls the “rebirth” of the psyche with and 
against the death drive.  Analysis as a kind of loving echo chamber through 
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which, like Echo, the analyst opens the space for the analysand to hear him 
or herself.   
Although Pleshette repeats the Kristevean rhetoric of birth and rebirth 
throughout The Right to Narcissism, in the final chapter, her text is 
punctuated, if not punctured, by Derrida’s metaphor of abortion.  Pleshette 
quotes Derrida describing mourning:  
We can only live this experience in the form of an aporia 
… where faithful interiorization bears the others and 
constitutes him in me (in us), at once living and dead.  It 
makes the other part of us, between us—and then the 
other no longer quite seems to be the other, because we 
grieve for him and bear him in us, like an unborn child, 
like a future.  And inversely, the failure succeeds: an 
aborted interiorization is at the same time a respect for the 
other as other, a sort of tender rejection, a movement of 
renunciation which leaves the other alone, outside, over 
there, in his death, outside of us.12  
This aborted interiorization is the otherness of the other, that which cannot 
be incorporated, what exceeds all narcissism of the self-same.  In Pleshette’s 
words:  
The gaze of the other remains infinitely other and will 
remain the other’s: No narcissism can wholly incorporate 
it and no subjective speculation can reduce its singular 
force.  Therefore, this being ‘in us’ should not be thought 
of as a purely interior speculation or as ‘narcissism’ as it 
has been traditionally understood.  For this inversion and 
dissymmetry of the gaze can only be internalized by 
wounding, fracturing, and exceeding the interiority that 
welcomes it in love and hospitality.13 
But the death of the other also interrupts narcissistic interiorization in 
another way that also could be described as aborted interiorization, only this 
time not the abortion of the other in the self but of the self-same in the 
fantasies of sovereign interiority and of self-consciousness as the interior 
fortress of the subject.  “Narcissism,” says Pleshette, “even armed with all of 
its tricks, is unable to reduce the other, whether dead or alive, to the 
structures of the same.”14   Rather, the other, dead or alive, “can only be 
internalized by wounding, fracturing, and exceeding the interiority that 
welcomes it in love and hospitality.”15  If self-sovereignty is a performance, 
then the death of the other is both the stage upon which it is played out and 
the curtain that signals that the performance is a ruse. 
What, then, are we to make of psychoanalysis and the attempt to 
recover and reconstitute the sovereign self from out of the depths of 
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mourning?  Can a “proper” psychoanalysis avow the wounding, fracturing 
and instability of the psyche confronted with the other, which both 
constitutes it and undoes it?  For, as Pleshette reminds us, the goal of 
psychoanalysis is to get an optimal return on one’s psychic investments and 
minimize loss.16  But, is it always the case, as Pleshette concludes, that 
whereas for Derrida mourning inaugurates the self, for psychoanalysis the 
self precedes mourning and is only subsequently destabilized by it?17  While 
this may be true for orthodox or “proper” Freudian psychoanalysis, as 
Pleshette so deftly demonstrates throughout her writings on Kristeva, it is 
not the whole story for an analysis that revolves around the “improper,” or 
in Kristeva’s terms, the abject.   
For Kristeva, abjection is both a precondition for narcissism and a 
challenge to it.18 Psychic space or interior experience, what Kristeva 
identifies with intimate revolt, is traversed by abjection.  It is a fluid space 
that conjures images of remote proximity as filled with otherness as it is with 
anything that might be called self-same, or even self-contained.  Negativity 
and expulsion are the centrifugal forces that spin out anything like a 
stabilized instability in and from this precarious interior space.  As Pleshette 
reminds us, for Kristeva abjection begins with the violent expulsion of one 
body from another during birth.  Abjection, or the improper, is there from 
the beginning before the clean and proper self.  
On Pleshette’s reading, Kristeva’s emphasis on the incorporation of the 
words of the other lend support to considering babbling wood nymph Echo, 
rather than pretty boy Narcissus, a model for subjectivity.  Indeed, for 
Kristeva what the contemporary Narcissus sees in the mirror is not pretty or 
even lovable, but instead his own abjection: “Today Narcissus is an exile, 
deprived of his psychic space, an extraterrestrial with a prehistory bearing, 
wanting for love.  An uneasy child, all scratched up, somewhat disgusting, 
an alien in a world of desire and power, he longs only to reinvent love.”19  
Narcissus as ET.  In her recent book, Marriage Considered as a Fine Art, 
written with her husband Philip Sollers, Kristeva lists people who have most 
influenced her thinking on love: Plato, Hegel, Freud, Stendal, and last but 
not least, Stephen Spielberg’s E.T.!  Narcissus phone home. 
In Marriage Considered as a Fine Art, Kristeva reiterates her claim from 
Tales of Love that we lack a discourse of love.  Love, she says, has become 
more obscene than sex.20 There is something sweetly obscene, even 
delightfully disgusting, about that little ode to love between Kristeva and 
Sollers.  Laughing about the conundrum of when your wife becomes your 
mistress, extolling the open relationship of Sartre and Beauvoir, and 
comparing marriage to bullfights, criminal acts, and literature, there is 
something unseemly about this public declaration of love.  Kristeva asks 
whether today anyone can without irony consider the ancient institution of 
marriage as securing sexuality for the life of two people, whether marriage is 
any more a legitimate convention.  She answers not really.  Rather, she 
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promises to try to describe love as “passion, precisely, without shame and 
without cowardice, without altering or embellishing it, while surrounded by 
false displays of spectacular sentimental obsessions, of erotic fantasies in 
which from now on the auto-fiction of “Selfies” becomes our pleasure.”21   
Within this banter between lover and beloved, there is more than just a little 
narcissism.  And yet, it is clear that in the course of nearly fifty years of 
marriage, they have found joy and sorrow together in the echo chamber that 
is love, whatever that may mean.   
Indeed, in the context of this lovers’ discourse, the story of Narcissus 
and Echo appears again to authorize their love.  In Marriage Considered as 
Fine Art, Kristeva maintains that by associating the look, the image, and the 
incapacity for love of the other with suicide, Ovid anticipates our 
contemporary difficulties with forms of autism that are symptomatic of 
virtual culture where we are interconnected primarily through screens and 
the internet.  She claims that a new discourse on love requires reinventing 
“the genealogy of the myth of Narcissism,”22 one in which “the erotic body 
imprints itself in phonemes, the flesh speaks, language isn’t just a sign 
conveying an idea,” or a mirror of self or world.23  Rather, the intertwining 
of flesh and sound, the reverberation of echoes in the body, give meaning to 
our experience and our loves against and beyond mourning and loss.  
Reinventing the genealogy of the myth of Narcissism is precisely what 
Pleshette does in The Right to Narcissism.  If that is a prerequisite for 
recreating a discourse on love, then Pleshette has put us on the right track.   
In terms of where we began, we could describe this reconfigured 
Narcissism in terms of proximity and distance, or a distance at the heart of 
proximity, at least insofar as that proximity becomes a basis for ethics, and 
even for politics.  In her discussion of disability, Kristeva argues for a 
democracy based on proximity rather than on contracts.  Considering 
disabled people when thinking about political rights and moral 
responsibilities challenges traditional notions of rights and equality based on 
rational autonomy and physical independence.  Kristeva suggests that it 
forces us to rethink democracy not in terms of contracts implicitly ‘signed’ 
by rational agents, but rather in terms of the proximity of otherness within 
the self. 
Within a proximity model rather than a contract model for social 
participation, the goal would not be integration so much as interaction based 
on sharing a world.24  Kristeva worries that integration means assimilation 
into the liberal political economy that values bodies only insofar as they are 
productive.  She argues against trying to turn every body into a productive 
worker through integration programs that define the value of humanity in 
terms of the ability to work or perform tasks.25  Indeed, she claims that our 
culture’s “maniacal surge of productivity” is an attempt to deny our 
fundamental vulnerability, a disavowal manifest in traditional philosophies 
based on rational autonomy of the will. 26  
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Her analysis suggests, while important, there is a contradiction in trying 
to integrate disabled persons into a political economy that values 
independence over dependence to the point of disavowing the 
interdependence and vulnerability that is fundamental to the human 
condition.  Dependence and independence are two sides of the same liberal 
ideal of autonomy; they are intimately connected rather than opposed.  And, 
it is their inseparability, namely our inter-dependence, which makes politics 
necessary.  Basing democracy on proximity—or, at least, a certain proximity 
suggested by Pleshette’s engagement with Rousseau, Kristeva and Derrida 
in The Right to Narcissism--rather than on contracts, reminds of who and 
what have been forgotten, disavowed, and excluded within the traditional 
social contract.   
In her early essay, “Renegotiating the Contract,” Pleshette argues that 
Kristeva’s inclusion of the psyche in the socio-symbolic contract allows for 
the process of abjection and exclusion to take place within rather than 
outside.  The inside and outside become intertwined such that exteriority is 
essential to interiority, and coming to terms with otherness in the self can 
work against projecting hatred and fear outside.  “The other,” says Pleshette, 
“so hated and desired, is no longer projected over there at a safe distance but 
is in me, disrupting my naïve assuredness of my own unity and purity.  In 
the birth of the self (as citizen), the other need not be made into a scapegoat, 
into a sacrificial victim…the ethical and political task of our time is that each 
psyche must come to terms with its ‘own’ impropriety—the improper 
understood as that which precipitates the emergence of the proper and that 
which ceaselessly destabilizes what sets itself up as proper.”27 This “new 
kind of social space…is not based on the logic of the scapegoat, of the inside 
versus the outside of the polis, but a new sort of solidarity that traverses 
national, ethnic, and economic borders and is founded on the consciousness 
of one’s unconscious.”28 The proximity of otherness within the self, 
otherness that is both constitutive of the self and at the same time 
destabilizes any self-certainty, self-sameness, and self-unity, gives us a new 
kind of ethical and political subject, a new kind of “we.”  One that is not one, 
but rather many.  One that is born, dies, and is reborn, through an aborted 
interiority.  One that comes to itself through the Other and others. 
The self may be nothing more than an echo, but this resonance between 
beings who mean, living or dead, can transform the clichés of our culture 
into singular events and declarations of love.  As Kristeva says in Sense and 
Nonsense of the Revolt, “’I’ will express my specificity by distorting the 
nevertheless necessary clichés of the codes of communication and by 
constantly deconstructing ideas/concepts/ideologies/philosophies that ‘I’ 
have inherited.”29 The relationship between intimate revolt and loving 
support makes it possible to transform the past into a future of hope out of 
hopelessness.  Kristeva calls this energetic pessimism.   
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With something like energetic pessimism, Pleshette imagines an ethics 
and politics based on a reconfigured narcissism, and “a new understanding 
of self-relation, in which to speak of and for oneself,” which “would as Echo 
knew well, pass by way of and be indebted to the other.”30  Only through 
the language of the other, can we speak our hearts and minds as ex-
appropriated, im-possible little narcissists.  Hear, now, the echo 
reverberating in Pleshette’s words, “It’s a love story, after all.”31  A tragic 
love story, to be sure, when the beloved is taken, as she is, always too soon, 
and we are left in “the position of the survivor truly untenable, often 
unbearable, always impossible.”32   
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